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1. Introduction: Description of the national sample
Between  early  November  and  mid-December  2004,  a  total  of  1010  young  people,  aged 
between 15 and 25 years old, have been interviewed in France. For the following analysis, the 
data base  has been adjusted for specific variations by taking an average of results on the basis 
of 1000 interviewees.
As illustrated by table 1.11, the main socio-demographic characteristics of the sample show the 
specificity of the social experience of the French youth today. Most of the young people are still 
in the educational system (64%): 42% are at school and 20% have entered university. Those 
who are already concerned by working life are less numerous : one third of the sample (34%) 
has already left school (26% have a paid work and 8% are unemployed).Within this working 
group , 60% do not have any high-school diploma (Baccalauréat).
This social and educational cleavage among the French young people creates some specific 
conditions regarding their political experience and participation. To be or not to be educated has 
a strong impact not only on the chances to get a job, a stable status , a social autonomy, but 
also on the process of the political socialization during this period of life.
The majority of the respondents (64%) declares that their standard of living is on average while 
19% estimate that their income is below average. The majority of the respondents live in an 
urban area (44% in big cities, 30% in small or medium ones). Only 26% live in a rural area. 
Most of them still live together with their parents (69%).  More than half of the respondents have 
parents who do not have a high-school diploma.
Almost all the respondents are French citizens (97%), and 94% are born in France. As we have 
no information about the citizenship of their  parents, it  is not possible to identify those with 
immigrants origins. Nevertheless 7% of the people declared themselves as being Muslims. This 
group is less favoured than the rest of the sample. Among the young Muslims, 31% declare to 
have a low or very low standard of living, 25% are in paid work and 10% are unemployed. One 
third (33%) is not educated, and 78% have parents who are not too.
Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics
Number Percentage
Gender
Male 510 51
Female 490 49
Age in 4 categories
15-17 ans 297 30
18-20 ans 299 30
21-23 ans 231 23
24-25 ans 173 17
Nationality
French 970 97
Other 30 3
Citizenship
French people born in France 941 94
French people born abroad 32 3
No French citizenship 27 3
Actual Household
Alone 105 11
With parents 693 69
With partner 156 16
Other 46 5
Do you have children ?
No 931 93
Yes 69 7
Type of settlement
Urban area 438 44
Small or medium city 304 30
Rural area 257 26
Status
In paid work 260 26
College or high school 422 42
Students 198 20
Unemployed 80 8
Other 40 4
Diploma in 4 categories
Still at school< maturity 433 43
Still at school >= maturity 204 20
Working < maturity 236 24
Working >= maturity 125 12
Diploma- gender - activity
Young men working/no diploma 133 13
Young women working/no diploma 102 10
Young men working/diploma 58 6
Young women working/diploma 67 7
Young men still at school 318 32
Young women still at school 320 32
Age when finished education
Still at school 638 64
Finished at age between 12 and 15 13 1
5
Finished at age 16 44 4
Finished at age 17 52 5
Finished at age 18 76 8
Finished at age 19 45 5
Finished at age between 20 and 25 131 13
Higher diploma of both parents
Don’t know/answer refused 89 9
Diploma<maturity 533 53
Diploma>=full maturity 378 38
Actual standard of living
Very low/low 192 19
Average 635 64
High/Very high 165 17
Religion in 4 catégories
Catholics 461 48
Muslims 72 7
Other religions 42 4
No religion 391 40
Religiousness
Very religious 75 8
Somewhat religious 195 20
A little religious 301 31
Not at all religious 394 41
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2. Political Interest, Competence and Knowledge
2.1 Political interest and competence
Young generations are always suspected to be less interested in politics and less politicised 
than their elders. But this observation is not really founded. They are more or less as interested 
in politics than the rest of the population. What they keep at distance is politicians and political 
affairs  concerning  partisan  quarrels  and  electoral  competition.  But  they  are  concerned  by 
national issues and international problems. So their answer to this question depends on what 
we consider as politics.
Politcal interest (%)
Very, fairly interested 35
Not very interested 35
Not at all interested 29
DK-AR 1
Total 100
35% of the respondents declare to be very interested or interested in politics, 64% are not very 
interested  or  not  at  all  interested.  Young  men  are  more  interested  than  young  women 
(38%/33%), and the oldest more than the youngest (40%/25%).  
The level of education has a strong effect. The more they are educated, the more they are 
interested. Educated young men are the most interested whereas not educated young women 
are the least (47%/21%).
Table 3: Interest in politics and competence
To  have  a  left  wing  or  a  right  wing  orientation  is  correlated  to  a  higher  level  of  interest 
(respectively 55% and 54%, around 20 points more than the average level). Young people who 
have no political orientation, neither left nor right are also the least interested in politics (21%, 
15 points less than the average).
  Political interest Political competence 
  Very, fairly interested Rarely-never 
 Total 36 21 
Khi-deux   0,000 Political interest 
Very, fairly interested (n=354)   30 
  Not very  interested (n=348)   13 
  Not at all  interested (n=290)   17 
Gender Khi-deux 0,297 0,014 
  Young Man (n=510) 38 24 
  Young Woman (n=490) 33 17 
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux 0,000 0,027 
  15-17 years (n=297) 25 19 
  18-25 years (n=703) 40 21 
Khi-deux 0,111 0,009 
YM working/no diploma(n=133) 34 15 Diploma/gender/activity 
YW working/no diploma(n=103) 21 14 
   YM working/diploma(n=58) 47 34 
   YW working/diploma(n=67) 42 22 
  YM still at school(n=318) 38 25 
  YW still at school(n=320) 34 18 
Status Khi-deux 0,000 0,006 
  In paid work (n=260) 36 20 
  At school (n=423) 29 21 
  Higher studies(n=198) 52 23 
  Unemployed(n=79) 33 18 
  Other (n=40) 28 15 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 Left right scale 
Left (n=359) 55 26 
  Neither nor(n=356) 21 14 
  Right (n=123) 54 27 
  DK (n=114) 6 17 
  AR (n=35) 36 31 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 
Both at least once(n=154) 55 21 
Only one parent at least 
once(n=81) 56 26 
Parental non conventional 
participation 
Both never(n=678) 31 20 
  Unknown (n=87) 14 20 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,006 
Both always(n=577) 42 21 
Only one parent always(n=68) 42 20 
Parental electoral 
participation 
Both not always(n=305) 25 18 
  Unknown (n=51) 14 29 
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Parental  influence  has  an  important  effect.  When  the  young  have  parents  who  are  also 
interested in politics, who participate to demonstrations or who vote at each election, they are 
themselves more interested in politics than the average. 55% declare they are very interested 
and interested among those who have both parents having already demonstrated, 42% when 
their both parents are regular voters (when their parents don’t vote regularly, they are only 25% 
to be interested).
Impression that politics is something complicated (%)
Always 17
Often 29
Sometimes 32
Rarely-never 20
DK 2
Total 100
Asked about their feeling that politics is something too complicated to understand it easily, eight 
out  of  ten do agree and only  21% feel  competent  and not  disoriented.  Politics  is  not  very 
accessible, even for young people who are very interested in politics : only 30% among them 
feel competent. Gender makes again a difference, whatever the high level of education : 34% of 
the young men having the baccalaureate feel competent, only 22% of the young women with 
the same level of education.
2.2 Political knowledge
This gender gap is even more visible concerning political knowledge. The sample is equally 
divided in two parts : 50% have a weak knowledge (16% very weak, 34% middle weak) and 
50% have a strong one (12% a very strong, 38% a middle strong).  But  55% of  the young 
women have a weak knowledge (46% of the young men) whereas 54% of the young men have 
a strong knowledge (45% of  the women).  Even when their  level  of  education is high,  their 
political knowledge is always lower than the young men ones.
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Table 4: Political knowledge
Interest  in politics  and ideological  orientation have a direct  impact.  More young people are 
interested in politics more they know about politics. Among those who are very interested and 
interested 21% have a high score of political knowledge ; when they are not at all interested 
they are only 5% in the same case.
Young people who locate themselves neither left nor right, are more numerous to have a weak 
knowledge (56%) ; those who locate on the left or on the right have a higher level of political 
knowledge  (respectively 61% and 65%). To have ideological and political orientations is directly 
linked to the interest and to the knowledge young people can express towards politics.   
2.3 Attitudes towards politics
This first overview of French young people interest and competence in politics gives an idea of 
the way politics takes place in their daily life. Politics is not out of their experience and of their 
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concerns. 56% declare their fathers are interested in politics, 47% their mothers, 27% their best 
friend. They are used to get some political news : 64% follow the news every day or several 
times a week. Television is the media the most used to get it : 68% watch TV first, the others 
media come far away behind (5% use the radio, 7% the newspapers, 7% the Internet).   
They are more concerned by national  (48%) and international  (41%) aspects  than by local 
(33%) and European (33%) ones. 
Nevertheless, when they are asked about what is politics for them, the image they give of the 
political universe is firstly negative: 69% of the young people believe that politics means empty 
promises, 64% think it is a game played by old men, 57% believe that politics is only about 
corruption and 50% think that politics does not address their expectations. A majority of the 
young people seems very disillusioned by politics. Only 38% believe it  is a way to create a 
better world… Nevertheless, if politics is mainly associated with negative items, it is also linked 
to  conventional  understanding:  “party  activities”  and  “voting”  reach  the  highest  level  of 
agreement (69%), to describe what they understand by politics. Moreover, more than half of the 
sample perceives politics as a way to solve international problems (58%) or societal conflicts 
(52%) and to take care of social issues (50%).
Figure 1: Attitudes towards politics: “politics is…” (sorted by agreement)
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To better understand why the French youth is so disappointed and critical about politics, we 
built  an indicator of  political  distrust based on answers given to question 23 item 7 (empty 
promises) and item 11 (corrupted)1. Half of the respondents (46%) are strongly distrustful of 
politics.
Oldest people are more disillusioned (the rate of defiance is 38% within 15-18 years group and 
52% within 24-25 years group).  Working people are more cautious than students (53% vs. 
42%). In addition, diploma and standard of living are also explicative variables: working people 
with a high level of education are less disillusioned than those who have no diploma (48% vs. 
56%). Working young men are the most critical, 59% of them have a strong distrust.
Moreover, people who are not at all interested in politics are those who are the most cynical, 
indeed, 52% of them are strongly distrustful. Politicised young people are less inclined to have 
such a distrust, especially if they locate themselves on the right; whereas 71% of the people 
who refuse to give their political position are strongly distrustful. Such a suspicion expresses 
their distance towards politics and the partisan game.
1 No distrust = respondent disagree with all items – Medium = respondent agree with one item – Strong= respondent 
agree with both items.
 
  No distrust  Medium Strong 
 Total 24 30 46 
Khi-deux 0,033 Political interest 
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 29 31 40 
  Not very interested(n=348) 21 32 47 
  Not at all interested (n=290) 21 27 52 
Age in 4 categories Khi-deux 0,004 
  15-17 years (n=297) 31 31 38 
  18-20 years (n=298) 19 33 48 
  21-23 years (n=231) 25 26 49 
  24-25 years (n=173) 18 30 52 
Khi-deux 0,002 Standard of living 
Very low, low (n=193) 20 26 54 
  Medium  (n=635) 23 30 47 
  High, very high (n=165) 31 36 33 
Khi-deux 0,000 Diploma 
Still at school < maturity(n=433) 27 33 40 
  Still at school >= maturity (n=204) 28 25 46 
  Working < maturity (n=235) 14 29 56 
  Working >= maturity (n=125) 23 28 48 
Khi-deux 0,000 Workers/students 
Workers(n=360) 18 29 53 
  Students (n=638) 27 31 42 
Khi-deux 0,017 
YM working/no diploma (n=133) 14 27 59 Diploma/gender/activity 
YW working/no diploma (n=103) 16 32 52 
  YM working/diploma (n=58) 28 29 43 
  YW working/diploma (n=67) 20 27 53 
  YM still at school (n=318) 27 31 42 
  YW still at school (n=320) 28 31 42 
Status Khi-deux 0,000 
  In paid work (n=260) 16 28 56 
  At school (n=423) 28 33 39 
  Higher studies (n=198) 28 26 45 
  Unemployed (n=79) 23 32 46 
  Other (n=40) 13 25 63 
Khi-deux 0,001 Left right scale 
Left (n=359) 20 35 46 
  Neither nor (n=356) 25 26 49 
  Right (n=123) 34 28 38 
  DK (n=114) 25 35 40 
  AR (n=35) 11 17 71 
 
12
Table 5: Political distrust
Three important cleavages have been identified to understand the way young people  
interest in politics and feel competent.
The first one is related to the age. Competence and interest grow according to the age.  
Youth is a period of intense political socialization and aging gives more knowledge and 
experience.
The second one concerns the gender gap. Young men have always more familiarity and  
more competence with politics and feel more concerned.
The third one is due to the level of education. More young people are educated more  
they are interested in politics.
But general attitudes towards politics are for most young people negative. And French  
politicians have to face a strong distrust and a lack of confidence, which are particularly 
problematic among the not educated young but also significant among educated ones.
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3. Ideological Orientations and Partisan Choices
The French youth is more left wing oriented than right wing. This ideological orientation among 
young people is a constant specificity for almost several years now. And except the middle of 
the 90’s, at the end of a long period of cohabitation between left and right which has crumbled 
the political and ideological marks and has disenchanted a bit the population, the youth has 
always given more support to the left than to the right. Today 36% of the entire sample locate 
themselves on the left, only 13% on the right. Among the oldest, having the right to vote, the left 
has the preference of 40% of the 18-25 years old, the right only of 13%. Among the entire 
population in France, the preference for the left is actually relatively equivalent (38%). We can 
note  that  Muslim  French  young  people  seem  to  be  more  leftist  and  radical  :  49% locate 
themselves on the left and none on the right.
But if the preference for the left is still dominant, we can notice an erosion of the capacity to 
locate on a left-right scale, among the youth, and more generally among the entire population. 
The left-right cleavage still functions as a basic ideological mark to interpret the political life and 
the political issues. But it is less and less relevant. In the survey barely half the sample clearly 
identify to the left or to the right (49%, and only 39% among the youngest, 15-17 years old). A 
large proportion answers neither left nor right (36%), or are not able to answer to the question 
(12%, and 22% among the youngest), and consequently give not a relevant signification to this 
distinction.
The possibility to locate between left and right strongly depends on the level of the interest in 
politics. More the young people are interested in politics more they locate themselves between 
left and right : 64% who are very interested and interested choose the left (55%) or the right 
(19%) and are really less numerous to give the answer neither left  nor right  (only 21%).  A 
contrario, young people who are not interested in politics, and especially those who are not at 
all interested, are few to locate on the left or on the right. To locate oneself within the ideological 
and political space is strongly correlated to the interest and to the competence you feel towards 
politics. And this competence itself depends on the level of education.
Table 6: Left-right orientation
  
  
Left 
Neither left 
nor right 
Right NSP RR 
 Total 36 36 13 12 3 
Khi-deux 0,000 
Political interest 
Very, fairly interested (n=354) 55 21 19 2 3 
  Not very  interested (n=348) 32 43 9 14 1 
  Not at all  interested (n=290) 18 46 8 20 7 
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux 0,000 
  15-17 years (n=297) 28 36 11 22 2 
  18-25 years (n=703) 40 36 13 7 4 
Khi-deux 0,000 
Diploma  
Still at school< maturity(n=433) 32 38 9 18 3 
  Still at school>=maturity(n=204) 44 28 17 6 4 
  Working<maturity(n=235) 34 43 11 8 4 
  Working >= maturity(n=125) 44 30 19 4 3 
Khi-deux 0,018 
YM working/no diploma(n=133) 39 38 11 8 4 Diploma/gender/activity 
YW working/no diploma(n=103) 27 50 11 9 4 
   YM working/diploma(n=58) 41 24 22 5 7 
   YW working/diploma(n=67) 45 35 15 3 2 
  YM still at school(n=318) 35 33 13 15 4 
  YW still at school(n=320) 37 36 10 14 3 
Status Khi-deux 0,000 
  In paid work (n=260) 40 36 14 6 4 
  At school (n=423) 32 38 10 18 3 
  Higher studies(n=198) 44 28 17 7 4 
  Unemployed(n=79) 36 42 10 10 1 
  Other (n=40) 24 42 13 16 5 
Khi-deux 0,000 
Religion 
Catholic (n=461) 33 35 18 11 2 
  Moslem (n=72) 49 33 0 14 4 
  Other religion(n=43) 38 43 17 2 0 
  No religion (n=391) 39 38 9 11 4 
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We have seen before the link between interest in politics and education. And we verify again the 
importance of the level of education on the ability to produce political opinions and attitudes. 
Those who have a low level of education, and especially those who have left school without the 
baccalaureate, are more numerous to not locate between left and right : 43% (only 30% among 
young  people  who  have  interrupted  their  studies  later  and  who  have  a  minima  the 
baccalaureate). This effect is particularly visible among not educated young women : 50% say 
they are neither left nor right (38% of young men in the same situation). According to the status 
and the level of education, the highest gap is between unemployed and students (42% of the 
first don’t locate between left and right only 28% of the students answer the same, - 14 points). 
According to their  dominant left  wing orientation, young people express partisan proximities 
which give advantage to the left camp : 13% are very close or close from the extreme left, 10% 
from the Communist Party, 27% from the Socialist Party, 27% from the Green. Only 6% say 
they are very close or close from the UDF, 8% from UMP, 6% from extreme-right.
Partisan closeness, whatever the party (extreme-right), is always higher among young people 
who are interested in politics, and is also more expressed among the oldest. The very young 
have more difficulties to situate themselves on the left-right scale and also among the political 
and partisan area. They are still more distant and less concerned.
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Table 7: Partisan proximity
  Ext.Left PC PS Greens UDF UMP Ext. Right 
 Total 13 10 27 27 6 8 6 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Political interest 
Very, fairly interested (n=354) 21 17 43 41 10 14 6 
  Not very  interested (n=348) 12 8 21 25 3 7 5 
  Not at all  interested (n=290) 5 3 14 13 3 2 5 
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
  15-17 years (n=297) 9 7 19 25 2 5 4 
  18-25 years (n=703) 15 11 30 28 7 10 6 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Diploma  
Still at school< maturity(n=433) 11 7 22 24 3 5 5 
  Still at school>=maturity(n=204) 13 12 39 38 10 12 3 
  Working<maturity(n=235) 16 13 20 23 5 7 9 
  Working >= maturity(n=125) 14 10 38 30 12 15 7 
Khi-deux 0,347 0,117 0,055 0,687 0,002 0,007 0,217 
YM working/no diploma(n=133) 14 12 23 26 4 6 10 Diploma/gender/activity 
YW working/no diploma(n=103) 17 15 17 20 6 8 7 
   YM working/diploma(n=58) 15 10 31 32 19 24 9 
   YW working/diploma(n=67) 13 11 43 29 6 6 5 
  YM still at school(n=318) 12 12 27 27 5 9 6 
  YW still at school(n=320) 12 6 28 30 5 7 3 
Status Khi-deux 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,007 0,000 0,000 0,000 
  In paid work (n=260) 15 12 27 26 8 11 7 
  At school (n=423) 11 7 22 23 2 5 5 
  Higher studies(n=198) 13 13 39 37 11 12 3 
  Unemployed(n=79) 20 16 26 29 6 9 11 
  Other (n=40) 8 0 20 27 5 3 10 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Left right scale 
Left (n=359) 28 23 64 45 3 3 2 
  Neither nor(n=356) 6 3 8 20 2 2 3 
  Right (n=123) 3 1 3 17 30 50 29 
  DK (n=114) 5 3 5 17 3 3 3 
  AR (n=35) 3 3 3 0 3 3 0 
NB:         
Extreme Left = LO, LCR, PT        
Extreme Right = FN, MNR         
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The level  of  education and the status introduce some distinctions which reveal  the political 
cleavages present in the entire population and which explain the actual political game in France. 
Among the left camp, some divisions are visible. Young people, not educated, already at work 
or who are looking for a job, are more in favour of extreme-left and communist left than students 
who express more closeness to the socialist left and to the Green. Among unemployed young 
people, 20% feel very close or close from extreme-left (13% among the students). Among the 
students, 39% feel very close or close from the Socialist Party (26% among unemployed), 37% 
from the Green (29% among unemployed).
These divisions reveal a social fracture within French young people which crosses the left, but 
which is also visible at the opposite of the partisan spectrum. The electoral capacity of the 
extreme-right in France for almost twenty years to gain some support from social categories 
particularly touched by precariousness and by changes on the market labour, has created a 
scission within the right camp and a tripartition of the political space. Young men, not educated, 
having a job or unemployed, are more numerous to feel some closeness to extreme-right than 
the rest of the youth (10% of the young men having a job, 11% of the unemployed).  
Positions on the left-right scale are coherent with the partisan proximities. Closeness to the 
parties  is  always  higher  when  young  people  can  locate  between  left  and  right.  But  it  is 
interesting to note that among those who answer neither left nor right, there is one party which 
gains more than the others their favour, the Green, 20%.
To look at which parties young people reject the most confirms the relative consensus about the 
acceptance of the socialist left and of the Green. Both are the less rejected. 31% of the young 
answer they feel very distant or distant from the Socialist Party and 28% from the Green. Within 
the left camp, extreme-left is less rejected than the Communist Party, a result which confirms 
the general sympathy within the French youth for some radical movements, coming from the 
troskyst and revolutionary tradition. Extreme-right is the party which they reject the most : more 
than two third (69%) declare they feel very distant and distant from it. Young people who locate 
themselves on the left are the most numerous to reject the extreme-right (91%). Those who 
locate on the right are only 58% to express the same distance. 
Classical  right  parties  are  more  rejected  than  classical  left  parties  (except  the  Communist 
Party), a result which confirms the more leftist political orientation of the youth today.
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Table 8: The most rejected parties
  Ext.Left PC PS Greens UDF UMP Ext. Right 
 Total 45 52 31 28 50 50 69 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Political interest 
Very, fairly interested (n=354) 47 54 27 22 58 59 76 
  Not very  interested (n=348) 43 51 30 26 49 47 71 
  Not at all  interested (n=290) 46 51 36 37 43 45 57 
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
  15-17 years (n=297) 41 46 29 26 39 40 62 
  18-25 years (n=703) 47 55 31 29 55 55 72 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Diploma  
Still at school< maturity(n=433) 44 49 30 28 44 44 63 
  Still at school>=maturity(n=204) 51 58 28 24 56 56 80 
  Working<maturity(n=235) 39 49 33 32 56 54 66 
  Working >= maturity(n=125) 53 59 34 27 55 56 77 
Khi-deux 0,347 0,117 0,055 0,687 0,002 0,007 0,217 
YM working/no diploma(n=133) 41 49 30 29 57 56 66 Diploma/gender/activity 
YW working/no diploma(n=103) 38 49 36 36 53 52 65 
   YM working/diploma(n=58) 51 58 32 25 49 51 72 
   YW working/diploma(n=67) 54 61 34 29 59 61 80 
  YM still at school(n=318) 48 53 30 26 47 48 69 
  YW still at school(n=320) 44 51 28 27 49 48 68 
Status Khi-deux 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,007 0,000 0,000 0,000 
  In paid work (n=260) 45 52 32 29 55 54 72 
  At school (n=423) 44 50 30 29 44 45 62 
  Higher studies(n=198) 52 58 28 24 56 55 79 
  Unemployed(n=79) 40 49 37 31 60 59 66 
  Other (n=40) 43 55 30 27 43 48 63 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Left right scale 
Left (n=359) 43 48 12 22 73 77 91 
  Neither nor(n=356) 43 54 38 28 45 44 63 
  Right (n=123) 78 84 72 52 33 23 58 
  DK (n=114) 35 38 27 23 30 30 47 
  AR (n=35) 17 20 17 18 14 14 21 
NB:         
Extreme Left = LO, LCR, PT        
Extreme Right = FN, MNR         
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According to the status and to the level of education, we can observe the same cleavages than 
before.  More young people  are educated,  more they express a distance towards extremist 
parties, above all towards extreme-right (79% among students), but also towards extreme-left 
(52% among students/45% within  the  whole  sample).Unemployed and not  educated young 
people are less reticent to extremism. But we can observe a difference according to the gender 
: young women are less distant from the extreme-left and young men from the extreme-right.
This overview of ideological attitudes and partisan proximities among the French young 
people give an idea of their acceptance of the political game and of the partisan space.  
We will  point three main results,  which are linked to the political  behaviours we will  
examine later.
The first one we have to keep in mind is the prevalent leftist orientation among young 
people who continue to give some signification to the classical left-right cleavage, and  
who, more or less, continue to interpret the political space with this elementary marker.  
But  half  of  the  young  people,  and  particularly  the  youngest,  don’t  recognize  this 
traditional partition. By answering they are neither left nor right, they also have more 
difficulties to adopt the partisan game and to play with it. A part important of the youth is  
not concerned by politics, partisan identification, and stay out of the game.
The second one is the gap between educated and not educated young people. Attitudes  
and political  choices are strongly linked to the educational  background. The level  of  
education  is  the  most  discriminating  variable  to  explain  the  political  attitudes  and  
orientations.  Sympathy  for  extremism, on the right  or  on the left,  is  more important 
among not educated who encounter more difficulties and precariousness on the labour 
market.
The third one is the weakness of the classical  right parties (UDF, UMP),  which have  
actually the executive and the parliamentary powers in France)  and the attractiveness of 
the Socialist Party and of the Green. Especially among the educated youth and among  
the students, these two parties, develop some consensual attitudes.
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4. Voting, non voting, electoral participation
Since recently, the registration on the electoral lists of the young people were not automatic. 
And an important proportion of the French youth was not registered, around a quarter between 
the age of 18 and 20 years old. In 1997, a new preview makes the registration automatic at the 
age of 18. The number of not registered in France has been reduced and has dropped from 9%, 
a constant proportion during the last twenty years, to 4% today. 
If we consider, as a basis to know how many young people are registered in our sample the 
declaration of those who were eligible at the last European elections, only 7% are not. Among 
them there is a strong proportion of young men, not educated. Compared to the quarter they 
were before 1997, registration has really progressed among the youth. But compared to the 
whole population, there is still a difference between the young people and their elders, probably 
due to the fact they move more and change of address.
Around six young people out of ten (59%) consider the act of voting as effective. Only 13% think 
it’s not effective It’s even the most effective political action to take decisions concerning the 
society, before to work in an association (42%) or to participate to a demonstration (26%). So 
voting is still considered as a real democratic tool to weight on the political system, to orientate 
policies, to maintain democracy. 
But if they are now numerous to be registered and if they think that voting is important and 
efficient, they also can abstain at the elections. In France, whatever the type of elections, young 
people abstain always more than the elders. 
In the survey, we have an over representation of voters, around 10 points more than in the 
reality. This is probably due to the fact that young people have been asked a long time since the 
date of the elections (two years and a half from the first round of the last general elections 2002 
and six months from the European elections June 2004). But it shows also the difficulty for the 
young  people  to  acknowledge  their  abstention.  Voting  is  still  considered  as   a  normative 
behaviour which engages responsibility and consciousness, and to not vote can be seen as a 
fault regarding the obligation of a citizen.
Near half of the sample (48%) aged 18-20 years has already voted, 74% of the 21-23 years old, 
and 73% of the 24-25 years old. The experience of voting seems familiar.
In 2002, at general elections, 47% of the sample were eligible, and two third of them (62%) 
have voted. Among the voters, women are more numerous than men (64%/59%), and educated 
people more than not educated ones (71% of the students, 51% only of the unemployed). We 
can count more non voters among the leftist than among the rightist (32%/19%), a gap which 
confirms the lack of support Jospin has encountered among his own camp. 
In 2004, at European elections, 61% were eligible, half of them has voted (52%). Again, there is 
a difference according the gender, young women have voted more than young men (55%/49%), 
and  according  the  status,  students  have  voted  more  than  unemployed  (57%/44%).  Young 
people who are neither left nor right have voted less than those who locate themselves between 
left and right (37%, 62% among the leftist, 74% among the rightist). 
Constant non voting is usually more important among young people than among their elders, 
and strongly correlated to sociological and political parameters. But it is the alternance of voting 
and non voting which is more and more widespread and indicates an new kind of electoral 
behaviour, especially among people who are educated and also interested in politics. Looking at 
the participation at the two last elections, General 02 and European 04, 44% of the sample in 
age to vote at the general elections 2002, have voted to each election, 38% have abstained 
twice, and 18% have voted at only one. Constant non voters are more numerous among people 
not at all interested in politics (57%), among young men (42% whereas only 34% among young 
women have abstained twice), and also among those who have not the baccalaureate (51% 
among  the  young  already  on  the  labour  market  without  it,  only  33% when they  have  the 
baccalaureate). Constant voting is more widespread among young people  very interested in 
politics (58%), among young women n (49%, only 39% among men) and among educated. But 
intermittent  voting  concerns  21%  of  the  young  very  interested  in  politics,  and  most  often 
students (23%),  some scores which indicate the attendance of a political abstention among the 
youth. 
Some characteristics distinguish voters and non voters at these two last elections in France.
22
Table 9: Abstention at General elections 2002 and at European elections 2004
Young people who abstain are usually less interested in politics. At European elections 2004, 
among those who were very interested and interested only 31% have not voted, and 25% at the 
first  round of  general  elections  in  2002,  expressing with  their  abstention  a  protest  attitude 
towards the political game and the partisan offer.  Among those who are not at all interested, 
they represent the double in 2004 and in 2002 (respectively 66% and 56%), and their abstention 
has another signification, it  is less political and shows more distance and more indifference 
towards politics. Again, the effect of the educational background is important and corroborates 
this distinction between these two kinds of abstention, political one and sociological one. Non 
voting is well known among not educated young people, and especially  among unemployed 
(56%).
  Abstention 2002 Abstention 2004 
 Total 38 48 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 Political interest 
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 25 31 
  Not very interested(n=348) 44 56 
  Not at all interested (n=290) 56 66 
Khi-deux 0,020 0,204 Diploma 
Still at school < maturity(n=433) 36 46 
  Still at school >= maturity (n=204) 29 43 
  Working < maturity (n=235) 47 54 
  Working >= maturity (n=125) 37 48 
Status Khi-deux 0,008 0,105 
  In paid work (n=260) 40 50 
  At school (n=423) 32 44 
  Higher studies (n=198) 28 42 
  Unemployed (n=79) 49 56 
  Other (n=40) 58 64 
Khi-deux 0,029 0,002 Type of settlement 
Urban area (n=438) 44 55 
  Small or medium city (n=304) 36 45 
  Rural area (n=257) 30 39 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 Left right scale 
Left (n=359) 31 38 
  Neither nor (n=356) 53 63 
  Right (n=123) 19 26 
  DK (n=114) 57 77 
  AR (n=35) 5 46 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 Parental electoral participation 
Both always (n=577) 28 36 
 Only one parent always (n=68) 37 40 
 Both not always (n=305) 56 71 
 Unknown (n=51) 70 81 
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Young people in rural areas, where the social control is more important, abstain less than in 
urban areas. The context of the socialization seems to be important. Within the family, the fact 
to have parents who always vote develop, as an example,  a strongest link to vote too. 
At the last European elections 2004 when young people have two parents who not always vote, 
their abstention climbs to 71%, when their parents always vote it downs to 36%. 
Among young people who vote, what are their choices ? Looking at their partisan proximities we 
have found a general and dominant support for the socialist left and for the Greens, but also 
some sympathies for extremist parties among not educated young people. Do we find a similar 
distribution of their preferences when they vote ?
At the last general elections 2002, six out of ten young people have given their suffrages to the 
left camp : 6% for the extreme-left, 7% for the Communist Party, 26% for the Socialist Party, 
19% for  the Greens.  The right  camp is  deserted :  4% for  UDF, 13% for  UMP and 7% for 
Extreme-right. We can note that 11% have voted white, a significant proportion which expresses 
a certain difficulty to make a choice among the partisan offer. 
To understand more precisely the significations and the uses of voting we have distinguished on 
one side the votes for some governmental parties (Socialist Party, UMP, UDF) and on another 
side the votes for parties which stay usually out of the governmental system and which have a 
function of protestation (Extreme-left (LO,LCR,PT), Communist Party, Greens, CPNT (Chasse 
Pêche Nature et Tradition), Extreme-right (FN,MNR)), plus white votes.
Young people in 2002 have voted more for a party belonging to the second type (47%) than 
for  a  party  of  the  first  type (35%).  This  confirms the  “negative  politicisation”,  actually  very 
present and relevant in the political context in France, using vote more to protest than to signify 
an adhesion to a political project or an identification to a party. This protest voting contributes to 
the crisis of the representative democracy which is deeply installed in France for some years 
now, whatever the colour of the political power. For the first time in France, at the first round of a 
presidential  election,  extremist  parties  on the  left  side  and on the right  side  have together 
gained quite a third of the suffrages in the whole electorate (30%). 
It  reveals a real political unrest and a growing lack of confidence towards the classical and 
governmental parties.  
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Table 10: Electoral choices in 2002
  
  
Government 
parties  
Others parties + 
invalid votes 
DK AR 
 Total 35 47 3 15 
Khi-deux 0,004 
Political interest 
Very, fairly interested (n=150) 41 47 0 11 
  Not very  interested (n=88) 26 45 7 22 
  Not at all  interested (n=46) 33 50 7 11 
Genre Khi-deux 0,032 
  Young Man (n=41) 41 44 1 14 
  Young Woman (n=29) 29 50 5 15 
Khi-deux 0,014 
YM working/no diploma(n=52) 29 62 0 10 Diploma/gender/activity 
YW working/no diploma(n=38) 21 66 3 11 
   YM working/diploma(n=35) 46 40 3 11 
   YW working/diploma(n=39) 36 44 8 13 
  YM still at school(n=49) 53 27 0 20 
  YW still at school(n=71) 30 46 6 18 
Khi-deux 0,000 
Left right scale 
Left (n=135) 41 49 1 9 
  Neither nor(n=75) 12 61 7 20 
  Right (n=57) 61 33 2 4 
  DK (n=9) 11 44 11 33 
  AR (n=10) 0 0 0 100 
NB:       
Government parties = PS, UMP, UDF  
Others = LO, LCR, PT, PC, Greens, other green movements , FN, MNR,Chasse, pêche, nature et tradition  
 
Gender on this aspect makes differences. Young women are less attracted by governmental 
parties  (29%/41%)  and  use  more  voting  to  protest  than  young  men  (50%/44%).  This 
protestation is still more developed among young women not educated: only 21% of them have 
voted  for  a  governmental  party  and  66% have  voted for  a  party  out  of  the  representative 
system. 
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The ideological  orientation  produces also  some effects.  Protest  voting  is  more widespread 
among leftist than among rightist (49%/33%), but above all concerns young people who have 
some difficulties to locate themselves between the left or the right (61%). Those latter are also 
more instable  with their  political  choices  and contribute to  the general  growing of  electoral 
volatility, another characteristic of the crisis of political representation in France.
Young people who have already voted white or who have abstained to protest represent a 
quarter of our sample (24%). These forms of protest concern more the oldest, but also educated 
people more than non educated. They define a kind of behaviour which characterizes a more 
critical  citizenship,  having  a  certain  political  competence  and  an  interest  in  politics,  but 
expressing a critical distance towards the partisan game. With this kind of behaviour they want 
to weight on the electoral results and to have an impact on the decisions.
Electoral choices of the young people at European elections 2004 are quite similar. Only 41% 
have voted for a governmental party : 26% for the Socialist Party and 15% for UMP and UDF. 
The others, more considered as protest voting, represent a majority, 51%.The Greens had a 
score of 18% ; Extreme left 6% and Communist Party together 8% ; Extreme-right gains 7%. 
Others votes and white votes totalise 12%.
  
  
Ext Left 
PS + 
DVG Greeens 
UMP, 
UDF, 
DVD 
Ext right Others 
Invalid 
votes 
DK AR 
   11 24 14 13 6 3 10 2 17 
Khi-deux 0,251 
Political interest 
Very, fairly interested(n=178) 13 26 13 14 7 4 8 1 14 
  Not very interested(n=91) 5 21 19 12 7 1 10 4 21 
  Not at all interested (n=48) 13 17 10 10 4 2 19 6 19 
Gender Khi-deux 0,437 
  Young man (n=153) 7 23 14 16 7 4 10 1 18 
  Young woman(n=166) 14 24 15 11 5 2 10 4 16 
Khi-deux 0,140 
YM working/no diploma 
(n=51) 
8 30 12 6 10 8 12 12 12 
Diploma/gender/activity 
YW working/no diploma 
(n=38) 
26 16 13 8 8 5 8 5 11 
  YM working/diploma (n=28) 4 18 18 25 7   11 4 14 
  YW working/diploma (n=35) 9 20 20 9 6   11 9 17 
  YM still at school (n=71) 7 23 14 18 6 1 7   24 
  YW still at school (n=92) 10 29 14 13 2 2 10 1 19 
Left right scale Khi-deux 0,000 
 Left (n=153) 17 44 18 3 1 1 2 1 13 
  Neither nor (n=80) 6 8 14 1 8 9 29 6 20 
  Right (n=62) 3 2 3 58 18 2 6 2 6 
  DK (n=7)     43       14 14 29 
  AR (n=13)                100 
Others = other green movements, MPF and others          
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Table 11: Electoral choices in 2004
To conclude this point on electoral participation, we have to keep in mind three main  
results. 
The first  one is  the importance that  young people  still  give to  voting.  It  is  not  only  
considered as the most effective political action but also as a symbolic link to guarantee 
democracy.
The second one is the importance of the abstention among the youth, even if in our 
survey it appears minimised. A part of this abstention has a political signification and is  
used as  a  new democratic  tool  to  weight  on  the  political  system,  especially  among 
educated young people and students. Another part is more sociological, and expresses 
less critical attitudes than distance and disinterest towards politics. This sociological  
non  voting  is  more  developed  among  the  less  educated  youth,  having  already  left  
school, and experiencing difficulties regarding their social integration within the labour 
market.
The  third  one  concerns  the  growing  number  of  protest  votes,  giving  suffrages  to  
extremist parties or to non governmental parties. Gender has a real impact, and young  
women express more choices outside the classical  partisan game.  The weakness of  
partisan identification  maintains a high level of electoral volatility and contributes to the 
general crisis of the political representation which is deeper among the youth. 
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5. Political Participation and Various Types of Involvement
1.1 Effectiveness of participation
French young people believe that voting is the most effective way to influence decisions in 
society (60% believe it is effective). Among those young people who believe in effectiveness of 
voting, we can note that the more people experience social difficulties, the less they are inclined 
to believe in the effectiveness of voting (51% of those who have a low or a very low standard of 
living compared to 77% of those who have a high or very high standard of living). Moreover, 
people who have a low education level less believe that voting is an effective way to influence 
decisions (55% within young working people without diploma compared to 61% within young 
working people with a higher education level). Young working men without diploma are less 
numerous to think that voting is effective (52%). Independently from their education level or 
social  situation,  young women are more confident  in  voting than young men.  Respondents 
interested in politics are more inclined to believe in voting effectiveness (80% within very/fairly 
interested people  compared to  40% within  not  at  all  interested group).  Young people  who 
declare a political orientation are also more entrusting in voting, especially rightists (78% of the 
rightists, 72% of the leftists and 49% of neither nor group). At least, when respondents are 
politically competent,  they believe that  voting is effective to influence decisions (75% within 
those who have a strong political  knowledge compared to 40% of those who have a weak 
knowledge).
Associations also play a prominent role. Indeed 45% of French young people believe it is an 
effect they are favoured, the less they are inclined to believe in associations. When they are 
politicised, they are more inclined to believe in associations’ effectiveness. Nevertheless, we 
can note some specificities: students are more inclined to believe that working in associations is 
an effective way to influence decisions,  maybe because they have more time than working 
young people to be involved in such organisations or maybe because they are more in contact 
with them (students associations are very numerous in French universities). Young women are 
also more confident in associations than young men (48% vs. 41%). At least, leftists are more 
entrusting in associations than rightists or neither nor group (respectively 52%, 42%, 40%).
The others forms of participation have a similar effect, as we can see on table 12. After voting 
and being a member of associations, working to get attention from the media and petitions are 
the  most  effective  way  to  influence  decisions,  according  to  French  young  people  (33%), 
followed by demonstrations (28%). We can note that young people believe in effectiveness of 
political actions such as petitions or demonstrations, even if they are not very involved in these 
activities… 
Political actions, such as working in a political party or contacting politicians are less effective 
according  young  people  (21% and  19%).  Only  very/fairly  interested  people  and  politicised 
people are inclined to be confident in such actions. 
Illegal  and violent protest  activities are, by a clear majority,  regarded as inefficient ways to 
influence decisions (61% of the respondents believe that illegal protest is not effective and 73% 
believe that violence is ineffective).
Figure 2: Effectiveness of ways of participation (11 point scale – recoded)
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Table 12: Effectiveness of political participation and socio-demographical and political variables
1.2 Political participation of French young people
During the last twenty years, non conventional political participation has been developed. To 
sign petitions, to demonstrate, to participate to some meetings, or to make strike, have grew up 
and have get progressively more and more legitimacy. In 1981, 31% of the French 18-29 years 
old had already done two or three of these protest actions, in 1999 they were 37%. In the whole 
French population, the increase is even more important : in 1981, 60 years old and more were 
only 13% to have participated to those types of political action, in 1999 they were 31%.2 The 
whole  French  society  gives  more  and  more  space  to  protestation  and  to  participative 
democracy. 
2 Pierre Bréchon, « Moins politisés mais plus protestataires », in Olivier Galland et Bernard Roudet (eds), Les 
valeurs des jeunes. Tendances en France depuis 20 ans, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2001.
Work in 
party
Work in 
associatio
ns
Vote Political men Media Boycott Demonstrations
Signing 
petitions
Illegal 
protest
Violent 
protest
Total 21 45 60 19 33 22 28 33 12 8
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,464
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 32 56 80 24 46 29 44 40 18 10
Not very interested(n=348) 18 39 55 15 28 22 22 31 7 6
Not at all interested (n=290) 12 38 40 16 22 15 13 25 9 7
Khi-deux 0,017 0,493 0,000 0,169 0,131 0,206 0,042 0,000 0,339 0,059
Very low, low (n=193) 19 41 51 17 36 26 26 36 16 11
Medium  (n=635) 22 45 58 20 31 20 26 32 11 7
High, very high (n=165) 22 50 77 16 39 27 37 33 10 5
Khi-deux 0,003 0,065 0,101 0,537 0,130 0,146 0,136 0,441 0,307 0,657
Still at school < maturity(n=433) 18 47 59 18 30 22 26 34 9 7
Still at school >= maturity (n=204) 30 50 66 20 40 24 33 34 15 10
Working < maturity (n=235) 17 38 55 19 30 19 24 32 12 9
Working >= maturity (n=125) 26 39 61 20 38 28 30 31 13 7
Khi-deux 0,169 0,040 0,082 0,850 0,341 0,535 0,158 0,040 0,649 0,278
YM working/no diploma (n=133) 19 39 52 19 28 19 24 30 12 10
YW working/no diploma (n=103) 14 38 59 18 31 19 24 36 12 6
YM working/diploma (n=58) 28 36 59 25 46 31 35 33 20 10
YW working/diploma (n=67) 25 41 63 16 30 26 26 29 8 6
YM still at school (n=318) 20 44 60 18 31 23 26 30 10 8
YW still at school (n=320) 24 53 63 19 35 22 30 37 12 8
Status Khi-deux 0,026 0,419 0,312 0,886 0,373 0,822 0,703 0,980 0,385 0,950
In paid work (n=260) 22 42 58 17 32 21 26 31 12 7
At school (n=423) 18 47 59 18 30 22 26 33 10 7
Higher studies (n=198) 30 49 66 20 41 24 33 34 15 10
Unemployed (n=79) 17 35 57 21 29 23 32 33 13 9
Other (n=40) 17 38 50 22 37 22 21 39 9 5
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Left (n=359) 27 52 72 20 41 30 42 37 18 9
Neither nor (n=356) 13 40 49 14 23 16 17 29 7 5
Right (n=123) 31 42 78 32 46 23 30 42 12 14
DK (n=114) 22 46 41 18 24 18 15 23 6 7
AR (n=35) 18 28 37 7 31 21 17 38 10 7
Left right scale
Political interest
Standard of living
Diploma
Diploma/gender/activity
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The protest action the most widespread among the French youth is to sign a petition. Two third 
of  them have already done it  (36%). A quarter has already demonstrated or  made a strike 
(respectively 26% and 25%). The boycott is less used (17%). Violent political actions stay very 
marginal : only 6% have already blocked a street or a railway, 2% have already participated to a 
demonstration with damages. 
Age makes difference  :  the  oldest  have  more  participated  to  all  types  of  actions  than  the 
youngest.  Gender  not  so  many.  But  the  strongest  effect  is  due  to  the  level  of  education. 
Educated people and students demonstrate and protest more : 43% of the young who are still 
students  after  the  baccalaureate  have  already  demonstrated,  47% of  them have  signed  a 
petition, 31% have already boycotted a product.
Table 13: Types of political participation (%)
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Has already 
… 
1) voted in elections 44 
2) cast an invalid vote 13 
3) not voted out of protest 8 
4) contacted a politician 5 
5) attended a public meeting dealing with 
political or social issues 
10 
6) signed a petition 36 
7) collected signatures 8 
8) held a political speech 2 
9) distributed leaflets with a political content 4 
10) boycotted certain products for political, 
ethical or environmental reasons  
12 
11) bought certain products for political, ethical 
or environmental  reasons  
13 
12) written political messages or graffiti on 
walls 
3 
13) worn a badge with a political message 4 
14) participated in a legal demonstration 26 
15) participated in an illegal demonstration 8 
16) participated in a strike 25 
17) donated money to support the work of a 
political group or organisation 
5 
18) contributed to a political discussion on the 
internet 
6 
19) written an article, e.g. in a students 
newspaper, organisation journal, or the 
internet 
5 
20) written or forwarded a letter/an email with a 
political content 
9 
21) participated in a political event where 
property was damaged 
2 
22) participated in a political event where there 
was a violent confrontation with the police 
3 
23) participated in a political event where there 
was a violent confrontation with political 
opponents 
2 
24) occupied houses, school/university 
buildings factories or government offices 
7 
25) blocked streets or railways 6 
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Political attitudes and orientations are strongly correlated to those kinds of participation. Young 
people more interested in politics participate always more. Among those who are 
very interested and interested 44% have already demonstrated, 55% have signed a petition and 
31% have made a strike. Leftists protest more than rightists. 42% among those who locate 
themselves on the left have already demonstrated, only 20% among those who locate on a right 
position. Those who are neither left nor right always participate less.
Parental  participation  has  also  an  impact.  Young  people  whom  parents  have  already 
demonstrated demonstrate more than the others (50%). Best friend participation seems still 
more correlated : 59% of those who have a best friend having participated to a demonstration 
do demonstrate. The political homogeneity of the affective and personal context has a great 
influence on the political participation of individuals. 
Protest activities depend also on the attitudes and judgments towards the government. Young 
people who express dissatisfaction are more disposed to protest and to demonstrate than the 
others : 37% among young people who are not satisfied with the government Raffarin have 
already demonstrated, only 24% when they are satisfied.
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Table 14: Types of political participation crossed by socio-demographical and political variables
Participation  at  school  is  quite  important  in  France.  Demonstrations  against  reforms of  the 
educational system are regular.  And most of the pupils have already get the opportunity to 
experience this kind of political participation. In the survey, 38% of the young respond they have 
already participated to a demonstration or to a strike at school. These last weeks, French pupils 
have organized a lot of demonstrations against a reform proposed by François Fillon, actual 
Minister of the Educational System. And they have gained. For twenty years now, the young 
people’s protest is so strong that each reform proposed is blocked, whatever the colour of the 
government, left or right. Young people still  at school do have a real political weight on the 
governmental decisions concerning the educational system.
Democratic activity is present in French schools : 40% of the young people have already been 
elected to represented their class. Participation of young people still at work is less developed.  
Attended a 
meeting
Signed a 
petition
Boycotted 
or bought
Legal 
demonstration
Illegal 
demonstration Strike Political mail
Total 10 36 17 26 8 25 9
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 22 55 37 44 13 31 24
Not very interested(n=348) 5 34 9 23 5 27 2
Not at all interested (n=290) 2 17 3 10 5 14 1
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux 0,005 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,005 0,004 0,234
15-17 years (n=297) 5 26 11 14 3 18 8
18-25 years (n=703) 12 41 20 31 9 27 10
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,073
Still at school < maturity(n=433) 7 30 13 18 4 20 8
Still at school >= maturity (n=204) 19 47 31 43 15 38 14
Working < maturity (n=235) 7 31 10 22 6 17 7
Working >= maturity (n=125) 14 50 24 37 11 33 13
Status Khi-deux 0,004 0,036 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,002 0,059
In paid work (n=260) 10 38 16 27 7 23 11
At school (n=423) 6 31 13 18 4 20 8
Higher studies (n=198) 18 46 31 42 15 37 14
Unemployed (n=79) 10 36 16 35 10 25 6
Other (n=40) 10 35 10 15 5 20
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,264 0,003 0,000
Left (n=359) 17 50 30 42 11 32 15
Neither nor (n=356) 5 31 11 20 6 20 5
Right (n=123) 11 41 15 20 7 26 15
DK (n=114) 2 12 3 11 4 18 2
AR (n=35) 12 18 21 12 3 15 3
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,138 0,000 0,000
Both a least once(n=154) 21 53 33 50 10 46 17
Only one parent at least once (n=81) 21 55 32 45 12 34 21
Both never (n=678) 7 32 14 20 7 20 7
Unknown(n=87) 2 22 5 18 3 11 6
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Au moins une fois (n=189) 26 62 37 59 17 48 26
Jamais (n=651) 6 31 13 18 6 19 6
DK - AR (n=142) 6 32 11 24 4 18 4
Khi-deux 0,017 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,365 0,024 0,000
Very, fairly satisfied (n=167) 11 32 13 24 5 22 11
Neither nor (n=355) 6 33 11 19 7 24 4
Not very, not at all satisfied (n=409) 14 45 27 37 10 29 14
DK - AR (n=69) 6 14 3 7 4 12 3
Parental non 
conventional 
participation
Demonstration of best 
friend
Satisfaction towards 
government
Political interest
Diploma
Left right scale
Youth involvement into political organizations or associations is very marginal. Only 1% declare 
to be members of a political party, 1% are members of a trade union, 2% of a human rights 
association, 2% of an environmental association. In France, there are not any more militants 
among the youth. Traditional political engagement is over and is replaced by non formal and 
spontaneous  forms  of  participation,  more  specified,  with  more  pragmatic  goals,  and  firstly 
concerning new politics issues.
Youth organizations (10% of members), cultural (11%) and sport associations (31%) are more 
attractive, especially among students. Young men are more numerous to be member of a sport 
club (40%/22%) and young women are more frequently in a cultural association (14%/9%). The 
level of education makes no difference concerning the sport. In return, youth organizations and 
cultural associations are more attractive among young educated people.
Table 15: Involvement in organisations
 
Member 
Participated in 
activity 
Done 
voluntary 
work 
 Yes Yes Yes 
1) Youth association or youth organisation  10 10 6 
2) Youth organisation of a political party 1 1 1 
3) Religious or church organisation, including religious youth 
organisation 
2 2 1 
4) Trade Union, including youth organisation of a trade union 1 1 0 
5) Political Party  1 1 1 
6) Environmental organisation 2 3 1 
7) Animal rights or animal protection group 2 3 1 
8) Peace organisation 1 2 1 
9) Human rights or Humanitarian Aid organisation 2 3 1 
10) Charity or social-welfare organisation 3 6 3 
11) Consumer association 1 0 0 
12) Cultural, music, dance or theatre group 11 11 4 
13) Women’s organisation 1 0 0 
14) Anti-globalisation organisation 1 1 0 
15) Sports club 31 29 8 
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Three main results characterize the political involvement of the French young people  
today.
First,  the  survey  confirms the fall  of  traditional  militancy.  Political  parties  and trade 
unions are not any more attractive, and the youth is more suspicious about them. They 
don’t want to be prisoner of an organization, they don’t want any more to adopt all their  
obligations and their political objectives. They probably want more to stay free, even free 
to  participation  according  their  own  views,  ideas,  and  methods.  There  is  a  kind  of  
privatisation of the political participation. But it does not mean they don’t participate.
Second, according to this last point, protest participation is more and more used and 
legitimated  among  the  population,  and  especially  among  the  youth.  Young  French 
people  can  be  described  as  a  protest  generation,  demonstrating  regularly  and 
spontaneously. Most of them have demonstrated already at school.     
Third,  there  is  still  a  cleavage  between  educated  and  non  educated  young  people,  
between students and those who have already attended a professional life, most often  
without any diploma. Those who participate the most are the first one. Young people 
who know some difficulties to enter into adulthood and to integrate social life with good 
conditions are less ready to participate, stay more far away from the political system. 
Their dissatisfaction and their protest don’t conduct them to a collective mobilization,  
and even to a personal implication.
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6. Attitudes  towards  society,  confidence  in  social  and  political 
institutions
1.3 Attitudes towards society
1.3.1 Standard of living
In our questionnaire we asked young people to tell how they apprehend their actual standard of 
living. This subjective actual  standard of  living enable us to analyse the way young people 
position themselves in society.
The majority of French young people estimate that their standard of living is on average. 19% 
say they have a low or very low standard of living.
Women seem to  be below average standard of  living,  but  percentages are not  statistically 
significant (see Khi-deux).
Older respondents have a lower standard of living than younger. This can be explained by the 
fact that younger people still live together with their parents and by the fact that older young 
people have more frequently to experience working life and autonomy. Students enjoy a higher 
standard of living, especially if they make higher studies.
Young active people who have a low level of  education are more numerous to face a low 
standard of living (35%). Moreover, young active women without diploma are more inclined to 
say they have a very low standard of living. As we have already noticed during the qualitative 
study, young women with a low education level are a very fragile population.
In general, we can say that diploma and activity status are discriminating variables with negative 
impact on standard of living.
Table 16: Actual standard of living
1.3.2 Pessimism in apprehending the future
In general, French young people express optimistic feelings when they compare their future 
situation to the actual situation of their parents: 63% think they would have a better income than 
their parents, 66% a better job and 44% a better quality of life and a better education. Social 
security is the topic that raises concerns: 37% of the respondents estimate they will have a 
worse social security and 36% say they will  have the same social security as their parents. 
Younger people are more optimistic than older.
People who experience a low or very low standard of living are rather pessimistic when they 
forecast their future: 21% think they will have a worse income, 17% a worse job, 47% a worse 
social security, 38% a worse quality of life and 27% a worse education (for people who have a 
high or  very  high  standard  of  living,  rates  are  respectively  8%,  7%,  30%,  17% and 13%). 
  
  
Very low - low 
Average High - very 
high 
 Total 19 64 17 
Gender Khi-deux 0,486 
  Young Man (n=510) 18 64 18 
  Young Woman (n=490) 21 64 16 
Age in 4 categories Khi-deux 0,000 
  15-17 years (n=297) 13 63 24 
  18-20 ans (n=298) 15 67 18 
  21-23 ans (n=231) 25 62 13 
  24-25 ans (n=173) 29 64 8 
Khi-deux  0,000 
Diploma  
Still at school< maturity(n=433) 13 66 21 
  Still at school>=maturity(n=204) 15 60 25 
  Working<maturity(n=235) 35 60 6 
  Working >= maturity(n=125) 18 73 10 
Khi-deux 0,000 
YM working/no diploma(n=133) 32 61 7 Diploma/gender/activity 
YW working/no diploma(n=103) 39 57 4 
   YM working/diploma(n=58) 15 75 10 
   YW working/diploma(n=67) 20 71 9 
  YM still at school(n=318) 13 64 24 
  YW still at school(n=320) 15 64 21 
Status Khi-deux 0,000 
  In paid work (n=260) 22 69 9 
     
  At school (n=423) 13 67 20 
  Higher studies(n=198) 15 59 26 
  Unemployed(n=79) 42 52 6 
  Other (n=40) 54 44 2 
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Diploma and activity status are significant explicative variables regarding apprehension of the 
future. Young active people who have a low education level are more pessimistic: 18% say they 
will have a worse income than their parents and 15% a worse job (the rates are respectively 
11% and 10%for young active people with higher level of education). Of course, unemployed 
young people are also very pessimistic: 20% estimate they will have a worse income than their 
parents and 16% a worse job (rates are respectively 13% and 12% for in paid work people).
NB: Regarding quality of life and education percentages are not statistically significant.
The apprehension of the future social security is quite different. Indeed, contrary to the other 
items,  it  is  the  most  educated  and  the  most  politicised  young  people  who  are  the  most 
pessimistic. 45% of those who make higher studies think that they will  have a worse social 
security than their parents. Among the respondents who have a paid job, those who have a 
high-school diploma are more pessimistic than those who have no diploma (42% of working 
men with full maturity vs. 40% of working men without diploma and 45% of working women with 
full maturity vs. 34% of working women without diploma). The question of social security is also 
a more politicized issue : young people who are leftist are more inclined to be pessimistic (40%) 
than the rightists (34%), we find here the traditional political cleavage, with a left-wing more 
concerned by social problems. We can also note that the more people are interested in politics, 
the more they are anxious for their future social security: 40% of those who have a political 
interest filiation and 48% of those who move to political interest say they will  have a worse 
social security than their parents.
Moreover, 42% of the young people having a medium strong political knowledge say they will 
have a worse social security than their parents (vs. 35% of those who have a medium weak 
knowledge). Political participation is also an explicative variable: those with at least one parent 
having already taken part in a demonstration or being regular electors are more pessimistic than 
those with parents non politically involved or voting sporadically (41% and 40% vs. 37% and 
37%).
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Table 17: Pessimism in apprehending the future
1.3.3 France’s main problems
For  French  young  people,  unemployment  and  poverty  are  the  most  important  issues  that 
France is facing today . Immigration is the less important. This result is not surprising, when we 
know that  economical  and  professional  situation  of  young  people  in  France  is  particularly 
alarming. According to the latest published statistics, the unemployment rate within 18-25 years 
old raises 21%. French young people are the first victims of the economical crisis.
Young women seem to be more concerned than young men (except for immigration).
  
  
Income 
 
Professional 
situation 
Social 
security 
Quality of  
life Education 
 Total 14 11 37 27 19 
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,003 0,057 
  15-17 years (n=297) 11 8 30 24 17 
  18-25 years (n=703) 15 12 41 28 20 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,003 0,000 0,008 
Standard of living 
Very low - low(n=193) 21 17 47 38 27 
  Medium (n=635) 13 10 37 26 18 
  High - very high(n=165) 8 7 30 17 13 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,002 0,001 0,527 0,083 
Diploma  
Still at school< maturity(n=433) 12 9 31 24 18 
  Still at school>=maturity(n=204) 12 10 46 28 20 
  Working<maturity(n=235) 18 15 38 29 20 
  Working >= maturity(n=125) 11 10 44 28 18 
Khi-deux 0,002 0,030 0,826 0,867 0,820 
YM working/no diploma(n=133) 20 18 40 32 21 Diploma/gender/activity 
YW working/no diploma(n=103) 17 13 34 24 19 
   YM working/diploma(n=58) 10 10 42 29 17 
   YW working/diploma(n=67) 12 11 45 27 20 
  YM still at school(n=318) 10 7 36 25 19 
  YW still at school(n=320) 14 11 36 26 18 
Status Khi-deux 0,000 0,001 0,003 0,369 0,048 
  In paid work (n=260) 13 12 40 28 20 
  At school (n=423) 13 9 32 24 18 
  Higher studies(n=198) 13 10 45 27 19 
  Unemployed(n=79) 20 16 41 33 26 
  Other (n=40) 18 10 29 23 8 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,009 0,000 0,000 
Left right scale 
Left (n=359) 13 11 40 27 19 
  Neither nor(n=356) 13 11 38 27 19 
  Right (n=123) 13 7 34 22 19 
  NA (n=14) 21 14 50 29 29 
  DK (n=114) 18 12 27 26 17 
  AR (n=35) 18 12 50 26 18 
Khi-deux 0,006 0,017 0,063 0,874 0,191 
Weak (n=161) 14 11 34 26 14 Political knowledge 
Medium weak (n=343) 16 13 35 26 22 
  Medium strong (n=375) 11 9 42 29 19 
  Strong (n=121) 12 10 36 22 14 
 
41
Concerning unemployment,  young people aged between 18 and 25 years old are the most 
concerned by this issue (82%), surely because contrary to the younger they are or will be soon 
in paid work and have to face this problem concretely. Young people who experience social 
difficulties are also more worried by unemployment, thus 81% of those who have a low or a very 
low standard of living think it is a very important issue. Young people who are less educated or 
whose parents have no full maturity degree are more inclined to think that unemployment is a 
very  important  problem (86% and  80%).  Among the  less  favoured  young  people,  working 
women with low education level are the most worried by unemployment (87%). We can note 
that  political  variables are not  statistically  significant  regarding unemployment,  it  is  a social 
problem which goes beyond traditional political cleavages.
Concerning  crimes  and  violence,  which  is  the  third  most  important  problem  (72%  of  the 
respondents think it  is  a very important  problem) we can note both a social  and a political 
cleavage. Working young people with low education level are more concerned by this problem 
than students or working high educated people (79% of working people without diploma think it 
is very important vs. 70% of working people with diploma or students). Moreover, 79% of the 
young people whose parents have no full maturity degree think that crimes and violence are 
very important problems, whereas 65% of those whose parents have a full  maturity degree 
share the same opinion. Young women seem more worried than young men. While violence is 
more frequent in the urban areas, only 64% of the young people who live in these areas think 
that it  is an important problem; whereas 79% of the young people living in a rural  area fell 
concern by crimes and violence. It is a well-known phenomenon that people who do not actually 
face violence or crimes meanwhile being influenced by media coverage, are more frightened 
than people who are confronted to them. The less young people are interested in politics, the 
more they tend to think that crimes and violence are very important problems (75% of not very 
interested  people  and  72%  of  not  at  all  interested  people  vs.  68%  of  interested  people). 
Moreover, if their parents are politically active, they tend to be less concern by these problems 
(only 62% of the young people whose both parents have already taken part in a demonstration 
think it is a very important problem). In addition, 81% of the young people who have a weak 
political knowledge consider that violence is a very important problem, they are only 67% to 
think the same among those who have a strong political knowledge. We can also note a left-
right cleavage regarding this problem: young rightist people are more inclined to consider it as a 
very important issue than leftists (81% of rightist young people and 86% of those who have a 
right filiation vs 63% of leftist young people and 61% of those who have a left filiation).
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Concerning the cut down on the welfare state benefits (55% of French young people think it is a 
very important problem),  we can note that both less favoured people and leftists feel  more 
concerned by this problem. 60% of those who have a low or  a very low standard of  living 
consider  it  is  a  very  important  issue  and  young  working  women  without  not  diploma  are 
particularly  worried  by  it  (69%).  Whereas  only  41% of  the  rightist  young people  think  that 
reduction of the welfare state is an important issue, they are 60% within the leftist.
Less educated people and less favoured people tend to consider that number of immigrants is 
an important issue that France has to deal with: more than half of the working people without full 
maturity  degree think  it  is  important  and 45% of  those  who experience  a  low or  very  low 
standard of living.
At  least,  we  can  note  that  young  Muslims  tend  to  be  more  concerned  by  poverty, 
unemployment,  racism,  drug  and the reduction  of  welfare  State,  than  other  young  people; 
probably  because  they  are  more touched by  these problems,  as  they  are  a  less  favoured 
population. On the contrary, Catholics, who are, for a majority of them, more favoured, tend to 
be more worried by violence and terrorism.
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Table 18: The most important problems in France
Pollution Poverty Immigration Racism Welfare state Unemployment Drug Crimes violence Terrorism
Total 64 75 45 62 55 77 63 72 66
Gender Khi-deux 0,004 0,050 0,560 0,082 0,033 0,208 0,001 0,056 0,313
Young man (n=510) 59 72 46 58 51 75 59 68 64
Young woman (n=490) 69 78 44 65 59 79 68 75 69
Khi-deux 0,703 0,258 0,001 0,206 0,006 0,000 0,012 0,982 0,953
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 64 79 45 58 60 81 65 73 66
Not very interested(n=348) 65 75 47 61 55 78 65 72 67
Not at all interested (n=290) 63 71 37 67 47 73 54 71 64
Khi-deux 0,864 0,345 0,654 0,862 0,000 0,006 0,049 0,179 0,006
Still at school < maturity(n=433) 65 74 44 64 50 71 62 70 67
Still at school >= maturity (n=204) 61 75 39 60 56 81 55 68 58
Working < maturity (n=235) 63 79 52 60 64 86 72 79 75
Working >= maturity (n=125) 69 70 45 60 50 77 66 70 62
Khi-deux 0,100 0,143 0,910 0,701 0,001 0,024 0,004 0,035 0,033
YM working/no diploma (n=133) 56 78 50 58 61 84 68 80 72
YW working/no diploma (n=103) 73 79 54 62 69 87 76 78 78
YM working/diploma (n=58) 61 68 49 51 54 83 61 69 56
YW working/diploma (n=67) 76 71 41 67 45 72 70 71 66
YM still at school (n=318) 60 71 43 60 46 70 55 64 62
YW still at school (n=320) 67 78 42 66 58 78 65 75 67
Khi-deux 0,156 0,057 0,000 0,020 0,001 0,910 0,000 0,000 0,081
Catholic (n=461) 66 71 48 60 50 76 67 75 71
Moslem (n=72) 54 85 38 78 68 81 71 74 60
Other religion (n=43) 60 74 51 65 60 81 57 74 67
No religion (n=391) 64 77 42 61 59 77 58 68 62
Khi-deux 0,159 0,035 0,000 0,313 0,000 0,604 0,002 0,002 0,000
Left (n=359) 67 80 38 62 60 78 55 63 54
Neither nor (n=356) 62 73 43 63 52 76 62 74 70
Right (n=123) 63 65 62 54 41 78 76 81 80
NA (n=14) 79 79 71 71 86 79 86 79 86
DK (n=114) 61 74 49 64 54 76 75 78 74
AR (n=35) 56 77 51 57 65 77 74 85 74
Diploma
Diploma/gender/activity
Religion 
Left right scale
Political interest
1.4 Political trust
1.4.1 Trust in political institutions
65% of the French youth do not trust politicians at all or a little bit, which is not very surprising 
as, in France, politicians are not highly regarded. Political parties and the government also don’t 
enjoy esteem as people tend to feel distrust for them respectively 58% and 54% of the young 
people do not have confidence in those institutions.
The national parliament, the European Community and the European Parliament generate a 
medium  level  of  confidence.  The  fact  that  French  young  people  trust  more  the  European 
institutions than the national ones is quite surprising.
Amnesty  International  (36%) and Greenpeace (31%) are  the  organizations  that  the  French 
youth trusts most. In general they are more confident in NGO’s than in political institutions. 
Table 19: Trust in political institutions
We built an indicator of trust in political institutions with the answers given to question 51 item 1 
to item 6 (political institutions): we counted people who choose to answer “not at all”, and we 
obtained a scale ranging from 0 (very strong trust in political institutions) to 5 (very weak trust in 
political institutions). In this part of the report, we analyse the profile of the young people who 
have a low level of confidence in the political institutions.
12% of our sample have no trust in the political institutions (see table 18). Less favoured people 
and a-political people are less inclined to be entrusting.
Regarding socio-demographic variables, older young people are less confident than older (13% 
vs. 9%). People who experience a low or a very low standard of living  are more circumspect 
about political institutions (15%). Young women are less confident than young men, especially 
Trust in…. Not at all/a little bit Neither-nor Very much/much 
Politicians 65 27 8 
Parties 58 34 8 
Government 54 34 12 
Parliament 52 34 14 
European Community 48 36 17 
European Parliament 47 35 18 
Attac 43 38 19 
Greenpeace 37 32 31 
Amnesty International 32 32 36 
 
young  working  women without  diploma  (20%).  Young  people  in  paid  work  or  unemployed 
people do not trust political institution very much (15%). Less educated young people also tend 
to be less confident than those who have a high education level (11% the students under full 
maturity degree and 19% of working people without a maturity degree).
Confident they are ( 20% of those who are not at all interested in politics have a very weak trust 
in political institution whereas the rate is only 6% for those who are very or fairly interested). 
Linked with political interest, people who have no political orientation have also a weaker trust in 
political institutions (14% of those who are neither rightist nor leftist  and 35% of those who 
refuse to give a political orientation). Moreover, young people who have a weak or a medium 
weak political knowledge are those who are the most circumspect about political institutions 
(16% and 13%).
1.4.2 Satisfaction towards the French government
Only 2% of the French youth is very satisfied with the French government. Most of them, 41% 
are dissatisfied/very dissatisfied with the government.
Young people at the age of 15-18 years are a little bit more satisfied than the average of the 
French youth (30%).
People who have a low or a very low standard of living and working people without diploma are 
more  dissatisfied  (respectively  53%  and  50%).  Within  these  less  favoured  young  people, 
unemployed are the most discontented  (55%). In addition, we can see that the less the people 
are politically competent, the more dissatisfied they are (55% of those who have a weak political 
knowledge and 46% of those who have a medium weak knowledge).
Regarding political variables, we can note that the more the people are involved in politics and 
the more leftist they are, the more dissatisfied they are. 50% of people who are very or fairly 
interested in politics are discontented with the government (compared to 36% for those who are 
not very or not at all interested). 55% of the young people who position themselves on the left 
are  critical  towards  the  government,  which  is  not  surprising  as  insofar  as  the  French 
government is rightist.  Maybe it  is  more surprising to see that  23% of  the rightist  are also 
discontented. Political involvement is also a significant variable, indeed, young people whose 
parents have already taken part in a demonstration or always vote are more inclined to be 
critical towards the government.
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Table 20: Trust in political institutions and dissatisfaction towards government
Three main results characterize the French young people’s attitudes towards society and 
confidence in social and political institutions.
Even if they express optimistic feelings when they forecast their future, they are very 
worried by unemployment and social security. Concerning these issues, social status 
  
  
No trust in political 
institutions: Satisfaction towards gouvernment  
  Strong Not very – not at all satisfied 
 Total 12 41 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 
Political interest 
Very, fairly interested (n=354) 6 50 
  Not very  interested (n=348) 10 36 
  Not at all  interested (n=290) 20 36 
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux 0,006 0,000 
  15-17 years (n=297) 9 30 
  18-25 years (n=703) 13 45 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 
Standard of living 
Very low - low(n=193) 15 53 
  Medium (n=635) 13 38 
  High - very high(n=165) 2 40 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 
Diploma  
Still at school< maturity(n=433) 11 31 
  Still at school>=maturity(n=204) 6 48 
  Working<maturity(n=235) 19 50 
  Working >= maturity(n=125) 9 45 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,005 
YM working/no diploma(n=133) 19 50 Diploma/gender/activity 
YW working/no diploma(n=103) 20 50 
   YM working/diploma(n=58) 3 46 
   YW working/diploma(n=67) 14 44 
  YM still at school(n=318) 8 40 
  YW still at school(n=320) 11 34 
Status Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 
  In paid work (n=260) 15 50 
  At school (n=423) 11 31 
  Higher studies(n=198) 6 48 
  Unemployed(n=79) 15 52 
  Other (n=40) 23 30 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 
Left right scale 
Left (n=359) 8 55 
  Neither nor(n=356) 14 36 
  Right (n=123) 9 27 
  NA (n=14) 14 8 
  DK (n=114) 12 25 
  AR (n=35) 35 59 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 
Weak (n=161) 16 31 Political knowledge 
Medium weak (n=343) 13 35 
  Medium strong (n=375) 9 46 
  Strong (n=121) 10 55 
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and education are particularly cleaving: more young people are educated,  more they 
have an optimistic apprehension of the society and of the future. Young people who  
encounter social difficulties tend to be more pessimistic and more concerned by socio-
economical problems.
Political institutions suffer from a deficit of confidence: young people do not trust them,  
especially politicians. They give more trust to NGO’s such as Amnesty International or  
Greenpeace. Trust in political institutions is strongly linked to social background and 
political  interest.  Young  people  who  experience  social  difficulties  tend  to  be  more  
defiant, whereas young people interested in politics seem a little bit more trustful.
At least, young people are not very satisfied with the actual French government and this 
dissatisfaction  is  generalised.  People  who  have  a  low  standard  of  living  and  a  low 
education level tend to be the most discontented. We can also note, that the more the  
respondents are politically competent or interested and the more they are dissatisfied.
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7. Belongings, beliefs and values
7.1 Identity 
An analysis of the sense of identity shows that :
- Young French feel first and foremost to be part of their family (91% position themselves 
on point 5 or 4).
- National and regional identity follow familial identity (respectively 80% and 66%).
- Then come the identification with the school/university (57%) and with the work place 
(45%).
- The supra-national dimensions – Europe and world – come last (respectively 43% and 
33%)
Regarding national identity, we can see that Muslim young people do not have a strong feeling 
of  belonging  to  the  national  community  (47%);  they  are  also  more  inclined  to  declare 
themselves as being citizens of the world (43%). This may be explain by the fact that they 
probably are from immigrant origins, so they may have a dual cultural background. They are 
also less favoured people, so they may feel a little bit excluded from the national community.
18-25 year old respondents have a stronger sense of trans-national identity (World citizen: 36% 
“very strong/strong” compared to 29% in the younger age group)
The more the respondents have a high level of education, the more inclined they are to feel 
European (for instance, 59% of those who made higher studies feel European). 
Political  interest  and  ideological  orientation  are  also  significant  variables:  the  less  the 
respondents  are  interested in  politics,  the  less  they  feel  to  be part  of  the  world  or  of  the 
European Union (World citizen:  24% “very strong/strong”  within not  at  all  interested people 
compared  to  45%  within  very/fairly  interested  people;  European:  28%  “very  strong/strong” 
compared to 57% in the very/fairly interested group). Young people who declare an ideological 
orientation tend to be more European than those who are neither rightist nor leftist, and the 
leftist  are a little  bit  more European than rightist  (54%”very strong/strong” within the leftists 
compared to 48% within the rightists and 34% within neither-nor). The leftists are more inclined 
to declare themselves citizens of the world than the rightists, who are more “patriotic”.(Citizen of 
the world: 44% “very strong/strong” among the leftists compared to 29% within the rightists; 
French: 80% “very strong/strong” within the leftists compared to 91% within the rightists).
Table 21: Identity
Total 33 43 80 66
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,060 0,028
Very, fairly interested (n=354) 45 57 83 63
Not very  interested (n=348) 30 42 82 69
Not at all  interested (n=290) 24 28 75 68
Age in 2 
categories Khi-deux 0,005 0,527 0,861 0,084
15-17 years (n=297) 29 42 80 71
18-25 years (n=703) 36 44 81 64
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,425 0,595
Still at school< maturity(n=433) 30 41 79 67
Still at school>=maturity(n=204) 44 58 81 63
Working<maturity(n=235) 26 34 80 70
Working >= maturity(n=125) 42 45 82 63
Khi-deux 0,117 0,003 0,227 0,326
YM working/no diploma(n=133) 29 32 76 64
YW working/no diploma(n=103) 24 38 85 77
 YM working/diploma(n=58) 44 53 84 59
 YW working/diploma(n=67) 42 38 82 68
YM still at school(n=318) 35 48 83 66
YW still at school(n=320) 34 45 77 66
Status Khi-deux 0,044 0,002 0,335 0,088
In paid work (n=260) 34 40 81 69
At school (n=423) 30 41 79 67
Higher studies(n=198) 44 59 82 62
Unemployed(n=79) 33 35 78 59
Other (n=40) 24 30 88 80
Khi-deux 0,197 0,063 0,000 0,026
Catholic (n=461) 34 48 87 71
Moslem (n=72) 43 33 47 59
Other religion(n=43) 36 35 76 57
No religion (n=391) 32 40 79 63
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,183 0,045
Left (n=359) 44 54 80 63
Neither nor(n=356) 27 34 77 68
Right (n=123) 29 48 91 74
DK (n=114) 27 37 81 67
AR (n=35) 41 38 83 54
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,548 0,828
Weak (n=161) 20 30 76 66
Medium weak (n=343) 28 37 78 66
Medium strong (n=375) 40 48 83 67
Strong (n=121) 50 64 83 68
Left right scale
Political 
knowledge
Political interest
Diploma 
Diploma/gender/ac
tivity
Religion
World Europe France Region
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7.2 Religion
In France, Catholicism is still the major religion, 48% of the respondents declare themselves as 
being Catholics. Nevertheless, an increasing number of people declare to have no religion, and 
among the respondents the percentage raises 40%.7% of the responds are Muslim, so Islam is 
the second French religious denomination. 
French young people are not very religious, 70% of the respondents declare themselves as 
being a little religious or not at all  religious. Only 8% of the respondents are very religious. 
Muslim  young  people  are  the  most  faithful  (78%  of  them  are  very  religious  or  religious). 
Catholics are the less religious people (37%), this may confirm the fact that in France a majority 
of people declares themselves as being Catholics, but the religious observance falls down.
Table 22: Religious denomination in France
Table 23: Religiousness (%)
We can note some socio-demographical differences among the religious groups. Muslim young 
people are the less favoured group: 31% declare themselves as having a low or a very low 
standard of living and 10% of the Muslim respondents are unemployed. Whereas only 7% of the 
young working Muslims have a high education level,  the rate reach 14% among the young 
working Catholics and 10% among the other religions group.
7.3 Political values and attitudes
In order to analyse French youth’s values and attitudes we built 3 indicators with the answers 
given to question 50.
 
Very 
religious 
Religious 
 
A little 
religious 
Not religious 
 
Catholics 7 30 46 17 
Muslims 44 34 18 4 
Other religions 19 29 30 22 
No religion 1 4 16 79 
Total 10 20 30 40 
 
Denomination Number Percentage 
Catholics 461 48 
Muslims 72 7 
Other religions 42 4 
No r li i  391 40 
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7.3.1 Economical liberalism
The first indicator is related to economical liberalism. We counted the answers given to item 10 
to 18 (items 11, 17 and 18 were recoded in order to be in the same direction as the others). If 
respondents disagree with all items, they are not at all liberal; it they agree with one item they 
are a little liberal; if they agree with 2 or 3 item they are almost liberal and if they agree with 4, 5 
or 6 items they are liberal.
French young people are not very liberal, indeed, as shown in table 22, only 15% of them are 
liberal whereas 30% are not at all liberal, and we can note that no respondent agree with all the 
8 items.
Concerning liberalism, gender and age are not statistically significant. The social situation and 
the left-right cleavage are the most significant variables to explain attitudes towards liberalism. 
16%  of  the  young  people  who  experience  a  high/very  high  standard  of  living  are  liberal 
compared to 9% of those who experience a low/very low standard of living.
As expected,  leftists  are  more  inclined to  be  not  at  all  liberal  (37%)  whereas rightists  are 
strongly  liberal  (29%).  The  left  right  cleavage  is  still  relevant,  but  probably  less  and  less 
cleaving, as 39% of the leftist have liberal attitudes.
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Table 24: Economical liberalism
Total 30 25 30 15
Khi-deux
Very low - low(n=193) 38 25 27 9
Medium (n=635) 28 26 30 16
High - very high(n=165) 28 22 35 16
Khi-deux
Left (n=359) 37 24 28 11
Neither nor(n=356) 28 26 33 13
Right (n=123) 15 24 32 29
DK (n=114) 40 25 25 10
AR (n=35) 20 29 29 23
Khi-deux
Filia Right  (n=81) 17 20 33 30
Filia Left (n=267) 38 22 27 12
Filia Neither nor(n=338) 32 25 29 14
Incohérence (n=90) 22 27 37 13
Changement (n=44) 30 34 20 16
Décrochage (n=101) 27 25 36 12
Filiation politique
0,000
Standard of living
0,055
Left right scale
0,000
Not at all 
liberal A little liberal
Almost 
liberal Liberal
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7.3.2 Tolerance
The second indicator measures the capacity of young people to be tolerant towards immigrant 
people  and  other  cultures.  It  is  based  on  answers  given  to  item  5  (recoded)  to  item  7. 
Respondents are tolerant if they disagree with all items or if they only agree with one item; they 
are intolerant if they agree with 2 or 3 items.
More than half of the respondents express tolerance towards others. Young women seem to be 
more open-minded than the young men (60% vs. 57%, but the khi-deux is not very significant). 
Younger people are more tolerant than people aged between 18-25 years old (63% vs. 56%). 
Diploma is a discriminating variable which can explain variation in the opening to others: the 
more the people are educated, the more opened they are. For instance, young working people 
without diploma are only 46% to be opened, whereas 56% of young working people with higher 
diploma are tolerant. Young people who are still in the educational system, at every level, are 
more opened than those who work (64% of the students are opened compared to 50% of the 
working people). People who live in urban area are more opened than people living in rural 
area, that can be explain by the fact that urban area are more mixed. We can note that Muslim 
young people are the most tolerant, 88% of them are opened to others, maybe because they 
are from immigrant origins. Attitudes towards politics are also explicative variables: the more 
interested the people are, the more opened they are (65% of the very/fairly interested people 
compared to 48% of the not at all interested people).The left right cleavage is very significant: 
72% of the leftists are opened to others, whereas only 28% of the rightists are tolerant.
7.3.3 Authoritarianism
The last indicator measures authoritarianism. It based on the answers given to items 1 to 4. If 
respondent  agree  with  3  or  4  items,  they  are  authoritarian.  48%  of  the  respondents  are 
authoritarian,  which  is  quite  surprising  for  young people… We do not  note any differences 
related to age, but gender is more effective. Young women are more authoritarian than young 
men (52% vs 48%), while at the same time they seem to be more opened to others. The young 
women facing social difficulties are the most authoritarian (65%). In general, social status and 
diploma may explain the variations: the less educated the people are, the more authoritarian 
they  are  (59% of  working  people  those  who  have  a  low  education  level  are  authoritarian 
whereas only 46% of working people with higher diploma are authoritarian). Working people are 
more authoritarian than students.
Like for tolerance towards others, the political variables explain the majority of the variations. 
The more interested in politics the people are, the less authoritarian they are (39% vs. 61%). 
The left right cleavage is even more important, indeed 70% of the rightists are authoritarian 
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whereas only  36% of  the leftists  reach a high level  of  authoritarianism. Nevertheless,  even 
among the leftists, the rate of authoritarianism is quite important. 
At least, political competence is also an effective variable: 58% of the young people who have a 
weak political knowledge are authoritarian, they are only 39% among those who have a strong 
political knowledge.
This high level of authoritarianism is an unexpected, and quite alarming, result of our survey. 
Since few years, we have to face a new tendency: French young people are more and more in 
demand of authority, especially among the lower social classes.
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Table 25: Tolerance and authoritarianism
  Autoritarian Tolerant 
 Total 48 58 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 
Political interest 
Very, fairly interested (n=354) 39 65 
  Not very  interested (n=348) 47 59 
  Not at all  interested (n=290) 61 48 
Gender Khi-deux 0,028 0,653 
  Young Man (n=510) 48 57 
  Young Woman (n=490) 52 60 
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux 0,595 0,82 
  15-17 years (n=297) 51 63 
  18-25 years (n=703) 51 56 
Khi-deux 0,012 0,210 
Standard of living 
Very low - low(n=193) 48 59 
  Medium (n=635) 51 53 
  High - very high(n=165) 37 66 
Khi-deux 0,008 0,000 
Diploma  
Still at school< maturity(n=433) 48 63 
  Still at school>=maturity(n=204) 37 65 
  Working<maturity(n=235) 59 46 
  Working >= maturity(n=125) 46 56 
Khi-deux 0,117 0,000 
YM working/no diploma(n=133) 54 49 Diploma/gender/activity 
YW working/no diploma(n=103) 65 42 
   YM working/diploma(n=58) 50 44 
   YW working/diploma(n=67) 42 66 
  YM still at school(n=318) 41 64 
  YW still at school(n=320) 49 63 
Status Khi-deux 0,080 0,000 
  In paid work (n=260) 53 50 
  At school (n=423) 46 62 
  Higher studies(n=198) 37 66 
  Unemployed(n=79) 48 56 
  Other (n=40) 66 40 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 
Left right scale 
Left (n=359) 36 72 
  Neither nor(n=356) 51 56 
  Right (n=123) 70 28 
  DK (n=114) 46 63 
  AR (n=35) 66 31 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,633 
Weak (n=161) 58 60 Political knowledge 
Medium weak (n=343) 53 55 
  Medium strong (n=375) 43 60 
  Strong (n=121) 39 62 
 
To conclude this point on identity and political values, we can keep in mind three main 
results.
French young people feel more to be part of their country than of Europe. European 
identity is not yet very firmly rooted in French people mind. Only people with an higher  
education level tend to really feel European.
Even if only 15% of the respondents are liberal, we can note an increasing acceptation of  
the liberal economical model among French society.
Unexpected result of our survey was the almost high level of authoritarianism within 
French youth. It is a new tendency which appears since some years: whereas French 
young people are almost tolerant , they are also more and more in demand of authority,  
especially within the lower social classes.
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8. Conclusion
The political  picture we have given of  the French youth shows different  characteristics  and 
specificities we would like to underline.
The first one concerns the general attitude French young people have towards politics. A strong 
distrust  and a very deep lack of  confidence are more and more widespread. This negative 
perception causes a great distance towards politics and a general suspicion towards politicians, 
or  at  the very least,  a  critical  attitude which is  more and more spread even among young 
educated and politicised young people. These both reactions indicate the importance in France 
of  the  crisis  of  the  political  representation  and  of  the  partisan  system,  which  is  especially 
problematical  among the  youth.  Partisan  identification  is  very  weak  and  traditional  political 
organizations are not attractive any more.
Despite of this strong distrust, French young people are still somewhat politicised. Their interest 
in  politics  is  equivalent  to  this  one we can notice  among the elders.  But  a  gender  gap is 
significant. Young men have more familiarity with politics and more knowledge about it  than 
women.
If young people do interest in politics more or less like the elders they feel less concerned by the 
institutional system and by the partisan game. They are more preoccupied by issues directly 
connected to the social  life  and to new politics,  as human rights,  antiracism, social  justice, 
equality…Most of them can spontaneously participate to collective protests and demonstration 
defending such reasons. Despite of this aptitude for protestation and the attention they give to 
these universals, their engagement in associations or new politics organizations stays low.
The  second  one  is  the  attachment  French  young  people  still  have  for  the  representative 
democracy. They do consider voting as the most effective democratic tool. Even if they abstain 
more than the elders , voting is still the most symbolic link to guarantee democracy.
Abstention is growing among the whole French electorate. Nevertheless it does not mean only 
indifference  towards  politics.  Non  voting  is  also  more  and  more  used  as  a  protest  tool, 
especially among young educated people who are interested in politics and even who can have 
a partisan proximity. The alternance of voting , non voting and demonstrating is more and more 
widespread among the French educated youth and define new kinds of citizenship. Political 
participation combines representative democracy and participative democracy. Young people 
express their choices and their political behaviours according to this enlargement of the political 
action.
The third one concerns their ideological orientations. Despite the fact more and more young 
people do not situate themselves between the left and the right, among those who still choose a 
camp,  there  are  more  leftists  than  rightists.  Socialist  Party  and  the  Greens  are  the  most 
attractive. Classical rightists parties (UDF,UMP) are less popular at the moment, and most of 
the young express dissatisfaction towards the actual government. We can notice that gender 
has  a  real  impact.  Young  women express  more  often  some  electoral  choices  outside  the 
classical partisan game and are more numerous to choose alternative parties.
The fourth result of our study , and may be the most relevant to understand the relationship 
between French young people and politics today concerns the social fracture within they do 
experiment. The gap between educated and not educated young, having already left school and 
experiencing difficulties to enter on the labour market,  is  huge. This educational gap has a 
strong impact on their political attitudes and behaviours. Less young people are educated, less 
they are interested in politics and also less they feel competent. If general attitudes towards 
politics  are  for  most  young  people  negative,  the  lack  of  confidence  and  the  distrust  are 
particularly problematical among the not educated ones.
Political participation also depends on the level of education. Less young people are educated 
less  they  do  participate,  whatever  the  type  of  participation.  They  vote  less  and  they  also 
demonstrate less. They stay more distant and more indifferent towards the political game. They 
do  not  use  any  democratic  tools,  conventional  or  unconventional  ones,  to  express  their 
demands or their opinions. This critical distance conducts some of them to feel more attracted 
by extremists right parties and by authoritarian issues.
Lastly, we can notice some trends which reveal recent new cleavages within the French society:
- the acceptation of the economical liberalism  is more and more widespread, even among 
the young leftists
- the demand of authority is quite high, even among young people who are used to be 
more tolerant
These new trends produce new political attitudes and behaviours which can have middle-dated 
unexpected effects on the electoral game, and more largely on the democratic system.
59
